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Abstract 
 
Our global economy has pushed the complexity of business transactions to a new level, as 
companies now employ sophisticated contracts and financial instruments. However, it is unclear 
whether accounting standards are able to effectively capture transaction complexity, which has 
been growing at a rapid pace. In this study, we examine three questions related to transaction 
complexity: (1) Do accounting standards reflect differences in the complexity of the transactions 
being recorded? (2) Does the use of mark-to-market (i.e., fair value) accounting reduce the 
complexity of standards by relying on market valuations to capture transaction complexity? (3) 
Does the reliance on fair value measurements reduce audit costs for transactions with significant 
complexity? Our findings suggest that complex transactions result in complex accounting 
guidance, making the standards difficult to read and understand. However, the use of fair value 
accounting might be a solution to the challenges arising from transaction complexity. Our study 
informs regulatory bodies, investors, creditors, and public companies that are increasingly 
concerned about the state of financial reporting standards, which arguably have become very 
costly to implement yet less effective in communicating the economic substance of complex 
transactions. 
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Transaction Complexity and the Movement to Fair Value Accounting 
Pinky Rusli, Xinlei Zhao, and David A. Ziebart1 
 
The knowledge economy has increased the complexity of business activities. Business 
transactions have evolved from simple exchanges of goods and services to exchanges involving 
sophisticated contracts and financial instruments. The proliferation of complex securities and 
derivatives, where dramatic uncertainty and contingencies exist, makes it difficult even for the 
profession and practice of law (Lipshaw 2005). Furthermore, organizations have become 
interdependent, since they engage in integrating and coordinating business processes (Ketchen, 
Crook, and Craighead 2014; Larsen, Manning, and Pedersen 2013). Increased transaction 
complexity follows from intertwined business relationships (Zhou 2012; Ding, Dekker, and 
Groot 2013).  
 Yet, it is unclear how current accounting and reporting standards anticipate the new 
complexities and uncertainties of business transactions. On the one hand, complex transactions 
demand that accounting standards become increasingly complex as well (see, e.g., Thornton 
2016). Importantly, the history and development of accounting thought, theory, and standards 
have been intertwined with broad economic development in a reciprocal linkage. Accounting is 
considered one of the oldest human recordkeeping systems and is designed to support 
commerce.2 Accounting is arguably an economic institution that always evolves in response to 
                                                 
1 We thank the faculty and doctoral students of the Von Allmen School of Accountancy at the University of 
Kentucky for their helpful feedback. We also thank Michael Ettredge, Yang Xu, and Han Sang Yi, who generously 
shared the variable codes and definitions from their study. Dave Ziebart gratefully acknowledges the financial 
support of the John H. Schnatter Institute for the Study of Free Enterprise. 
2 Luca Pacioli is often hailed as the father of accounting. While he was not the inventor of the system of double-
entry bookkeeping, he was the first who described it systematically in his book, Summa de Arithmetica, Geometrica, 
Proportioni et Proportionalita, published in 1494. Double-entry bookkeeping is still the basis of today’s accounting 
systems. See Sangster (2016) for details of the genesis of double-entry bookkeeping. 
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market forces (Waymire and Basu 2008; Watts and Zuo 2016). As such, accounting practices 
and standards are expected to adapt to transaction complexity. 
 On the other hand, Dye, Glover, and Sunder (2015) aptly argue that formulating complex 
accounting standards in response to transaction complexity can be problematic. They assert that 
it is not feasible for accounting standard-setters to incessantly promulgate complex rules in order 
to win the “arms race” against the development of transaction complexity. Innovations in 
transaction complexity escalate rapidly because sophisticated financial experts continuously 
engineer transactions to keep up with modern economies (Glode, Green, and Lowery 2012). In 
contrast, new accounting rules take years to develop. The development of accounting theory 
combined with financial reporting standards due to changes in the level of complexity underlying 
business transactions and activities has been somewhat simultaneous, with both theory and 
standards usually lagging behind the development in commerce. Accordingly, to some extent, 
accounting has always been playing catch-up with the underlying business transactions. 
 Dye, Glover, and Sunder (2015) also point out that the desire to constantly update 
standards may lead standard-setters to write overly detailed and complex rules that, ironically, 
result in suboptimal financial reporting. In a similar vein, Lev and Gu (2016) claim that 
accounting regulation has grown excessively complicated in response to the complexity of the 
business environment. They describe this phenomenon as “the Lev-Gu law of the dynamics of 
regulation,” which means that “regulatory systems strive to be even more complex than the 
structures or institutions they were charged to regulate” (2016, 221). Lev and Gu argue that the 
escalation of accounting complexity is a major reason for the deterioration of usefulness in 
accounting information. The increase in accounting complexity makes accounting information 
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difficult to decipher. At the same time, the information is losing its relevance because accounting 
standards are unable to capture all the nuances of business complexity (Lev and Gu 2016). 
 The first objective of our study is to find empirical evidence that the complexity in the 
underlying transactions is manifested in the complexity of the authoritative guidance used in the 
affiliated reporting standards.3 Our investigation draws upon a fundamental notion in systems 
theory, which dictates that all control mechanisms, including accounting regulation, require a 
more complex mechanism than the process or activity being controlled.4 Our findings support 
this argument. Next, our study examines the economic consequences of accounting complexity. 
Specifically, we show that an audit fee premium is placed on complex transactions. In addition, 
we conjecture that the use of fair values for financial accounting and reporting is more effective 
than overly complex accounting standards to cope with the increase in transaction complexity. 
Supporting our hypothesis, our study suggests that the audit fee premium is mitigated when 
using fair values instead of complex authoritative guidance. Drawing on this finding, our study 
provides insights into the development of accounting standards moving toward a fair value 
approach. 
 In the following sections, we discuss a paradigm for thinking about financial accounting 
and reporting standards setting. Then, we elaborate on our research questions as well as describe 
the research processes we employed and the results we obtained. Last, we summarize our 
inferences and their implications for theory and practice. 
 
                                                 
3 Sargut and McGrath (2011) differentiate between complex and complicated in a business context. They argue that 
the term complicated denotes multiple components where the combination results in a predictable outcome, while 
the term complex denotes an individual component or multiple components in which the outcome is much less 
certain. Our definition of complexity is intended to capture both terms. 
4 Based on this theory, our perspective concurs with the Baruch-Lev law of the dynamics of regulation. 
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Theoretical Framework and Hypothesis Development 
Fundamental Paradigm of Accounting Standard Setting 
Since accounting is a human contrived system, accountancy theory and practice are determined 
by consensus regarding (1) what is to be measured, (2) when it is to be measured (recognized or 
derecognized), (3) how it is measured, (4) who is the entity for which the accounting occurs, and 
(5) where the element or activity takes place. While the genesis of this paradigm is uncertain, 
Wallman (1995, 1996) uses a similar approach in discussing accounting and disclosure issues 
facing the profession. In essence, accounting and disclosure issues can be considered a question 
or a combination of questions regarding the following: 
 Issues of definition. Does the transaction result in an identifiable element that meets the 
criteria needed to be an asset, liability, equity, revenue, expense, gain, loss, or income 
(earnings)? 
 Issues of timing. When does the transaction or an event result in a cue for recognition, de-
recognition, revaluation, or allocation? 
 Issues of measurement. If a transaction meets the definition of an element and the timing 
cue is met, should the element’s value be measured based on its historical value, current value 
(including current entry value and current exit value), or expected future value? 
 Issues of reporting entity. What is the boundary that defines the reporting entity? Does 
the transaction take place within the reporting entity boundary or does it span the boundary (such 
that it is deemed an arm’s-length transaction)? Determining the entity’s external or internal 
boundary may determine or impact issues of definition, timing, or measurement. For example, 
consolidation requires the elimination of intra-entity profits and losses (a form of derecognition). 
7 
 
 Issues of geographical location. In instances where the geographical location attributable 
to the transaction is important, the location may need to be determined. 
 
Research Question 1: Transaction and Accounting Complexity 
The complexity of a transaction can impact any individual issue or a combination of issues 
within the paradigm above. We expect that the complexity of a transaction will be manifested in 
the affiliated financial accounting or reporting pronouncement. To define accounting complexity, 
we follow the definition from the SEC’s Advisory Committee on Improvements to Financial 
Reporting (ACIFR), which highlights various causes of accounting complexity. One possible 
cause is the complex nature of business activities. Another is financial standards that enumerate 
detailed guidance or lack the use of simple terms (i.e., plain English) due to the challenge in 
describing sophisticated transactions (SEC 2008). 
 Based on the ACIFR’s definition, we argue that the readability level of a pronouncement 
captures the complexity of an underlying transaction that the pronouncement is written to cover.5 
A complex transaction requires a more detailed, complex explanation in the affiliated 
pronouncement, making the descriptions in the pronouncement harder to explain in plain 
English. In contrast, simple or less complex transactions will result in simpler language for the 
affiliated pronouncements. Stated formally, our first research question is as follows: 
                                                 
5 Prior work in accounting does not offer a formal definition of accounting complexity. For example, Peterson 
(2012) does not distinguish between complex accounting guidance and complex transactions, claiming that it is 
impossible to differentiate the two. Other studies (see, e.g., Miller 2010; Rennekamp 2012) assert that financial 
reports have become overly complex and challenging for an average investor to understand, but these studies do not 
identify or examine the sources of accounting complexity. 
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RQ1: Do accounting standards reflect differences in the complexity of the transactions 
being recorded? Specifically, does the complexity of a transaction manifest in its 
affiliated pronouncement? 
 
Research Question 2: Transaction Complexity and Fair Value Accounting  
Our contention is that the evolving complexity of transactions will continue and that 
authoritative pronouncements will continue to be difficult to read and understand since writing 
standards to address the what, when, how, who, and where questions will require even higher 
levels of readability. However, the use of mark-to-market (fair value) accounting may simplify 
the authoritative pronouncement, since fair values are the result of a complex process that readily 
addresses the difficult what, when, how, who, and where questions or issues through the invisible 
hand of the market. Market values represent a consensus that spans all attributes of the 
underlying transactions (at least, all attributes that are known by the market participants) and 
readily incorporates dealing with issues of definition, timing, and measurement. Reliance on 
market values may greatly simplify the difficulties of writing standards since the standard will 
not need to provide explicit authoritative guidance regarding the issues of definition, timing, and 
measurement.6 
 To test this conjecture, we will focus our analyses on a specific pronouncement: SFAS 
No. 157 (Fair Value Measurements). This pronouncement defines three measurement hierarchies 
to value assets or liabilities. The highest is Level 1, which indicates the existence of active 
markets for the assets or liabilities to be valued. Accordingly, the assets or liabilities can be 
                                                 
6 Our conjecture is consistent with the ACIFR’s recommendation to reduce financial reporting complexity. The 
committee recommends “a judicious approach to expanding the use of fair value” and staying away from the mixed 
attribute models, whenever possible, since the complexity often arises from using those models (SEC 2008). 
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measured reliably using quoted prices. The second level is Level 2, which indicates the existence 
of active markets or quoted prices for similar assets or liabilities. Level 3 is the lowest 
measurement level. It requires the highest involvement because no active market is available for 
the specific assets or liabilities. Accordingly, the measurement is more complex than using 
quoted prices because it requires various assumptions, information, and a measurement approach 
to be defined and applied. 
 We expect that Level 1 should be easier to read than that of Levels 2 or 3 because Level 1 
measures asset and liability values directly using market prices, avoiding complexity. 
RQ2: Does the use of fair value accounting reduce the complexity of standards by 
relying upon market valuations to capture transaction complexity? Specifically, is the 
readability of Level 1 described in SFAS 157 lower than the readability of Levels 2 or 3? 
 
Research Question 3: Transaction Complexity and Audit Fees 
We argue that complex transactions increase audit fees because they are difficult for auditors to 
measure and verify.7 In addition, we expect that the use of fair values can mitigate the audit fee 
premium. Specifically, we argue that it takes less effort to audit assets and liabilities using the 
Level 1 measurement than to audit assets and liabilities using Level 2 or 3 measurements. This 
reduced audit effort will be reflected in a lower audit fee. Stated formally, our third question is as 
follows: 
RQ3: Does the reliance upon fair value measurements reduce audit costs for 
transactions with significant complexity? Specifically, are the audit fees for Level 1 
assets and liabilities lower than the audit fees for Level 2 or 3 assets and liabilities? 
                                                 
7 In June 2014, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) launched the Simplification Initiative, a series of 
projects that aim to simplify GAAP, reducing the cost and complexity of financial reporting (FASB 2014). 
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Research Methods 
Question 1: Analysis of Readability of Standards and Underlying Transaction Complexity  
To investigate our first and second research questions, we start by measuring the readability 
score of various transactions. We then employ a survey to collect responses from accounting 
experts. The objective of our survey is to ask experts to categorize selected transactions as either 
the most or the least complex transaction group. After obtaining two groups of transactions based 
on their perceived complexity, we analyze whether this classification corresponds to its 
readability level. 
 
Readability Scores of Pronouncements 
We select 30 accounting transactions prescribed by pronouncements issued by the Financial 
Accounting Standards Board (FASB) from 1973 through 2009. We believe that our selection 
covers prevalent transactions that vary widely in the levels of transaction complexity. Then we 
measure the readability score of each pronouncement using the Flesch-Kincaid Index, a widely 
known readability measure. The Flesch-Kincaid Index is a function of two variables: average 
sentence length (in words) and complex words (based on the percentage of words with many 
syllables). The score generated by this index indicates the minimum school level appropriate for 
comprehending the text being measured. For example, if the Flesch-Kincaid score of a text is 10, 
it means that the text is best understood by average students with a 10th grade reading level and 
above. Table 1 summarizes the readability scores of all the pronouncements we include in our 
analysis. 
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Table 1: Readability Scores of Selected FASB Pronouncements 
Transaction types Affiliated pronouncement 
 Flesch-
Kincaid 
Score  
Postretirement benefit obligations other than pensions SFAS 106  17.16  
Financial instruments with both debt and equity characteristics SFAS 150  16.30  
Compensated absences SFAS 43  15.67  
Comprehensive income SFAS 130  15.64  
Financial instruments SFAS 105  15.55  
Business segments SFAS 14  15.28  
Defined benefit pensions SFAS 35   15.27  
Contributions made or received SFAS 116  15.13  
Mortgage origination, mortgage-backed securities, long-term loan servicing SFAS 65  15.05  
Defined benefit pensions, defined contribution pensions SFAS 87  14.98  
Liability extinguishment SFAS 125  14.97  
Depreciation for not-for-profit entities SFAS 93  14.77  
Foreign currency translation SFAS 52  14.75  
Derivative instruments SFAS 80  14.64  
Business combinations SFAS 141  14.63  
Related party transactions SFAS 57  14.42  
Derivative instruments, hedging activities SFAS 133  14.27  
Long-term obligations SFAS 47  14.18  
Accounting changes, error corrections SFAS 154  14.12  
Leases SFAS 13  13.89  
Income taxes SFAS 96  13.85  
Asset impairment, long-lived asset disposal SFAS 144  13.42  
Subsequent events SFAS 165  13.37  
Research and development costs SFAS 2  13.36  
Revenue recognition with right of return SFAS 48  13.21  
Prior period adjustments SFAS 16  12.94  
Mean readability score  14.65 
 
 Table 1 shows that the mean readability score is 14.65, which indicates that accounting 
standards appear to be difficult to read. The most difficult pronouncement to read in our set is 
SFAS No. 106 (readability score = 17.16), which guides transactions related to postretirement 
benefit obligations other than pensions. The easiest pronouncement to read is SFAS No. 16 
(readability score = 12.94), the guidance for prior-period adjustments. 
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Survey Design and Delivery 
We designed our survey instrument using Qualtrics, a web-based survey tool. We used the 
preliminary version of our survey to run a pilot test and obtain feedback from eight doctoral 
students at the University of Kentucky. The purpose of the pilot test was to measure the time 
required to complete the survey. 
 Based on the responses from the pilot test, we finalized the survey instrument and invited 
accounting faculty members at the University of Kentucky and the University of Wisconsin-
Madison to participate in our survey. We used email to distribute our survey link to faculty. The 
survey was administered over the Internet and was anonymous. We emailed the invitation to 
participate in the survey on August 1, 2016. We received the last response on August 17, 2016. 
 The survey asked participants to select at least 20 out of 30 transactions that participants 
believed they had familiarity with or knowledge of. To mitigate order effects, we randomized the 
order of the selection list. Given their choice sets, participants had to classify transactions into 
the most and the least complex transaction groups, respectively. Participants were told that each 
group should contain at least five transactions and that the order of the selection did not matter. 
We administered brief demographic questions at the end of the survey. 
 
Summary Statistics 
We received 10 responses total from both the faculty of the University of Wisconsin-Madison 
(response rate: 100%) and the University of Kentucky (response rate: 45%). On average, 
participants spent 6.16 minutes to complete the survey. Table 2 reports the demographic 
characteristics of our participants. Sixty percent have taught financial accounting courses for one 
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to six years, whereas 30 percent have taught for seven years or more. Panel B of table 2 reports 
the participants’ self-assessment rating of their familiarity with accounting pronouncements on a 
scale of 1 to 7, where higher values correspond to higher knowledge and understanding. The 
mean (median) of rating is 4.2 (4.0), signifying that our participants view themselves to have 
fairly significant knowledge regarding accounting pronouncements. 
 
Table 2: Demographic Characteristics of Survey Participants 
Panel A: Participants’ teaching experience in selected accounting courses  
Financial 
accounting 
Managerial 
accounting 
Auditing Accounting 
information 
systems 
Taxation Other 
None 1 4 4 10 8 8 
1–3 years 5 3 1 0 0 0 
4–6 years 1 0 2 0 0 0 
7–10 years 2 1 1 0 1 1 
> 10 years 1 2 2 0 1 1 
 
Panel B: Self-assessment of familiarity with accounting pronouncements (scale of 1 to 7; 7 is the 
highest) 
 Mean Median 
Familiarity score 4.2 4.0 
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Table 3: Survey Responses to the Question: “Select accounting transactions you are 
familiar with” 
Transaction % participants (total 
possible n = 10) 
Research and development costs 100 
Asset impairment 100 
Subsequent events 100 
Prior period adjustments 100 
Business segments 90 
Long-lived asset disposal 90 
Accounting changes 90 
Error corrections 90 
Long-term obligations 90 
Related party transactions 90 
Leases 80 
Financial instruments 80 
Business combinations 80 
Post-retirement benefit obligations other than pensions 70 
Comprehensive income 70 
Defined contribution pensions 70 
Contributions made or received 60 
Liability extinguishment 60 
Hedging activities 60 
Revenue recognition with right of return 60 
Foreign currency translation 60 
Mortgage origination 60 
Mortgage-backed securities 60 
Income taxes 60 
Derivative instruments 50 
Financial instruments with both debt and equity characteristics 50 
Defined benefit pensions 50 
Compensated absences 40 
Long-term loan servicing 40 
Depreciation for not-for-profit entities 40 
 
Survey Responses: Familiarity with Accounting Transactions 
Table 3 presents the percent of participants stating their familiarity with a given accounting 
transaction. All participants claim that they are familiar with transactions pertaining to (1) 
research and development costs, (2) asset impairment, (3) subsequent events, and (4) prior-
15 
 
period adjustments. Additionally, 90 percent of participants indicate their understanding of 
transactions related to (1) business segments, (2) long-lived asset disposal, (3) accounting 
changes, (4) error corrections, (5) long-term obligations, and (6) related party transactions. 
Collectively, six or more participants (out of 10 total) are familiar with 24 out of the 30 
transactions listed in our survey. 
 
Survey Responses: Transactions with the Highest Complexity 
Table 4 reports the percent of participants indicating the complexity levels of a given transaction. 
Our survey results reveal that the most complex transactions are hedging activities (60%) and 
business combinations (60%). Following closely behind is financial instruments with both debt 
and equity characteristics (50%). Furthermore, 40 percent of our participants think that the most 
complex transactions are related to (1) financial instruments, (2) derivative instruments, (3) asset 
impairment, (4) defined benefit pensions, and (5) income taxes. 
 
Survey Responses: Transactions with the Lowest Complexity 
Seventy percent of our participants decided that the least complex transactions are those 
corresponding to prior period adjustments. The results in table 4 also show that the least complex 
transactions are related to error corrections (60%), subsequent events (50%), and long-term 
obligations (50%). In addition, 40 percent of our participants believe that transactions concerning 
(1) research and development costs, (2) contributions made or received, (3) long-lived asset 
disposal, and (4) accounting changes fall into the least complex transaction group.  
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Table 4: Survey Responses to the Question: “Perceived complexity levels of accounting 
transactions” 
Transaction % highest 
complexity 
(total possible 
n = 10) 
% lowest 
complexity 
(total possible 
n = 10) 
Readability 
score 
Hedging activities 60 0 14.27 
Business combinations 60 10 14.63 
Financial instruments with both debt and equity 
characteristics 
50 0 16.30 
Financial instruments 40 0 15.55 
Derivative instruments 40 0 14.64 
Defined benefit pensions 40 0 15.27 
Income taxes 40 0 13.85 
Asset impairment 40 10 13.42 
Postretirement benefit obligations other than 
pensions 
30 0 17.16 
Leases 20 0 13.89 
Revenue recognition with right of return 20 0 13.21 
Mortgage-backed securities 20 0 15.05 
Foreign currency translation 20 30 14.75 
Related party transactions 20 30 14.42 
Accounting changes 20 40 14.12 
Long-term loan servicing 10 0 15.05 
Business segments 10 10 15.28 
Subsequent events 10 50 13.37 
Prior period adjustments 10 70 12.94 
Comprehensive income 0 10 15.64 
Liability extinguishment 0 20 14.97 
Compensated absences 0 20 15.67 
Mortgage origination 0 20 15.05 
Depreciation for not-for-profit entities 0 20 14.77 
Research and development costs 0 40 13.36 
Contributions made or received 0 40 15.13 
Long-lived asset disposal 0 40 13.42 
Long-term obligations 0 50 14.18 
Error corrections 0 60 14.12 
 
Statistical Test of a Difference in Readability Levels for High and Low Transaction Complexity 
To test for a difference in the pronouncement complexity of the topic areas identified as being 
the most complex versus those identified as being the least complex, we first computed the mean 
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of the readability score for the two groups (the most and the least complex). The mean for each 
group is based on at least 40 percent of the respondents identifying the topic as being the most 
complex or the least complex. Next, we weight the readability score by the number of 
participants identifying the topic as either in their most complex or their least complex grouping. 
This resulted in a mean readability score of 14.78 for the most complex group and a mean 
readability score of 13.71 for the least complex group. The difference in means is 1.07.  
 To test for the statistical significance of this difference, we employ a computer intensive 
approach (Diaconis and Efron 1983). The use of a resampling method is quite applicable given 
our small number of observations, and it replaces the necessity of the Gaussian assumptions of 
classical statistical methods via computation power (Diaconis and Efron 1983). This “allows us 
to be free of the non-bell-shapeness” that may not exist in our data (Diaconis and Efron 1983, 2).  
  We employ a “hypothesis test for a difference in means” described by Simon (1999, 38–
39). Our null hypothesis is that there is no difference in the readability scores of the transaction-
associated pronouncements identified as being the most complex or least complex. In essence, 
we compute the probability that the observed difference in the mean readability scores for the 
high complexity and low complexity groups (14.78 – 13.71 = 1.07) would be observed if the two 
groups are drawn from the same population. We use 10,000 iterations with replacement (a 
bootstrap procedure) and find that the probability is less than 0.01 percent that a difference of 
1.07 would be observed if both groups are drawn from the same underlying distribution. Note 
that this is, in essence, the type 1 error. Our choice of sampling with replacement is likely to 
result in a conservative type 1 error since an observation can be chosen more than once in a 
single iteration.  
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 To answer our first question, we find that the readability levels of the accounting 
pronouncements associated with the groups of transactions identified as high complexity and low 
complexity are significantly different, and the underlying transaction complexity is manifested in 
a higher readability level for the associated pronouncement. In essence, a more complex (higher 
reading level) pronouncement is needed for transactions that are more complex. 
 
Question 2: Analysis of Readability of SFAS No. 157 
To answer our second question, we focus our analysis on SFAS No. 157. The readability score of 
SFAS No. 157, Fair Value Measurements, is 14.08 for the entire pronouncement (including 
appendixes). For the main standard discussion, the readability score is 14.76. For the sections 
related to the Fair Value Hierarchy, Level 1 Inputs, Level 2 Inputs, and Level 3 Inputs, the 
overall readability score is 16.5. The readability scores for the specific sections regarding Level 1 
Inputs, Level 2 Inputs, and Level 3 Inputs are 15.5, 17.5, and 16.7, respectively. These 
readability scores significantly exceed the readability scores associated with complex topics 
identified in the prior section of this study, where the mean is 14.78. The findings show that the 
readability score of Level 1 is lower than the scores of Level 2 or Level 3. 
 We interpret this finding to suggest that the transactions underlying SFAS No. 157 are 
quite complex. This is not surprising, given that the examples discussed in the Implementation 
Guidance section of the pronouncement contain transactions or situations such as a business 
combination, in-process research and development in a business combination, asset impairment, 
software assets, interest rate swap and other types of derivatives, and restricted assets.  
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Question 3: Analysis of Audit Pricing Evidence Where Underlying Complex Transactions Are 
Accounted for Using Mark-to-Market 
Overview of Analyses 
We analyze two samples. One is comprised of nonfinancial companies, while the other consists 
of financial companies. We use two different research models to analyze the effect of fair value 
measurement on audit fees. First, we use Model 1 to examine the sample of nonfinancial firms 
following prior literature (Hribar, Kravet, and Wilson 2014; Francis, Reichelt, and Wang 2005; 
Ghosh and Lustgarten 2006; Bills, Lisic, and Seidel 2016) and include a fair value measure. The 
resulting model, including industry and year fixed effects, is specified as: 
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹)𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 =  𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝑉𝑉𝐹𝐹𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽2𝐵𝐵𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵4𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽3𝐹𝐹𝐵𝐵𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 +
𝛽𝛽4𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴)𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽5𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽6𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽7𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽8𝐵𝐵𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽9𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 +
𝛽𝛽10𝐹𝐹𝐵𝐵𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽11𝐵𝐵𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝐵𝐵𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽12𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅_𝑌𝑌𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽13𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽14𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 +
𝛽𝛽15𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽16𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽17𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡    (1) 
The dependent variable is Ln (AUDIT FEE), which is the natural-log-transformed value of audit 
fees from the Audit Analytics database. The variables of interests are FV_TT, FV1_TA, FV2_TA, 
FV3_TA, and are defined as fair-valued asset and liability amounts measured using Level 1, 
Level 2, and Level 3 inputs and deflated by total assets.8 
For the control variables, we include Ln(ASSETS), FGN, INV, REC, CR, BTM, LEV, 
EMPLS, MERGER, and NDEC_YE to control for audit complexity and resource demands; ROA 
                                                 
8 We use the proportions of fair-valued assets rather than log-transformed amounts of fair-valued assets as test 
variables because the correlations with control variables are much lower (Ettredge, Xu, and Yi 2014). We also run 
the analysis with the proportions of fair-valued assets only. In the untabulated results, we obtain similar results and 
inferences when we use the proportions of fair-valued assets only.  
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and LOSS control for the inherent risk related to poor performance, which leads to increased 
audit effort; and LITIG, an indicator variable for industries with higher litigation risk. 9  
 We use Model 2 to examine the sample of financial firms specified following Ettredge, 
Xu, and Yi (2014) and Fields, Fraser, and Wilkins (2004) as:  
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹)𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 =  𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝑉𝑉𝐹𝐹𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽2𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴)𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽3𝐹𝐹𝐵𝐵𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 +
𝛽𝛽4𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽5𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽6𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽7𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 +
𝛽𝛽8𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽9𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽10𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝐸𝐸𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 +  𝛽𝛽11𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 +
𝛽𝛽12𝐵𝐵𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽13𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽14𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽15𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑉𝑉𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 +
𝛽𝛽16𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐵𝐵𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡          (2) 
 The dependent variable is Ln(AUDIT FEE), a natural-log-transformed value of audit fees. 
The variables of interest are the fair-valued asset and liability amounts deflated by total assets. 
The control variables are proportion of transaction account (TRANSACCT), proportion of 
securities (SECURITIES), efficiency ratio (EFFICIENCY), common loans (COMMLOAN), 
nonperforming loans (NONPERFORM), net charge-offs (CHGOFF), capital ratio (CAPRATIO), 
intangible assets (INTANG), sensitivity (SENSITIVE), and savings institution (SAVINGS). Fields, 
Fraser, and Wilkins (2004) expect all the coefficients except that on SENSITIVE to be positive, 
and find that the coefficients on LOGTA, BIGN, TRANSACCT, SECURITIES, EFFICIENCY, 
COMMLOAN, NONPERFORM, CHGOFF, CAPRATIO, INTANG, and SAVINGS are positive 
and significant at the 0.10 (one-sided) level or better. The details of variables definition are in 
appendixes A and B.  
                                                 
9 Developed by Francis, Philbrick, and Schipper (1994), this measure controls for four industries with a high 
incidence of litigation, which would lead auditors to charge higher fees. 
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Nonfinancial Firms Sample Results 
Sample  
Table 5 presents the sample selection procedure for our audit fee Model 1, where we extract 
financial data from Compustat and audit fee data from Audit Analytics. We collect our initial 
sample of 80,693 firm-year observations from Compustat for the years 2008 to 2015. We 
exclude all 29,546 firm-year observations from the financial services industries (SIC code 60–
69). Next, we require firm-year observations to have audit fee data available in Audit Analytics; 
this requirement eliminates 14,564 firm-year observations. Last, we exclude 13,961 firm-year 
observations that lack the necessary data to calculate control variables. Our final sample 
comprises 48,795 firm-year observations. 
 
Table 5: Sample Development for Nonfinancial Firms 
  Number of firm years 
Total firm-year observations available in Compustat,  
2007– 2015 80,693 
Less:  
Observations from financial services industries  -28,798 
Observations without information to calculate audit fee -13,483 
Observations with insufficient data to calculate control 
variables -19,047 
Final sample 19,365 
 
Table 6 reports the descriptive statistics for our sample. We report the mean of our 
dependent variable Ln(AUDITFEE) as 13.74, which is consistent with Ettredge, Xu, and Yi 
(2014). Additionally, the descriptive statistics of the audit fee determinants are consistent with 
levels reported in prior literature (Simunic 1980; Hribar, Kravet, and Wilson 2014). 
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Table 6: Descriptive Statistics for Nonfinancial Firms 
Variable N Mean Median Std Dev 25% 75% 
ln_fee 19,365 13.740 13.826 1.417 12.899 14.644 
fairlv_tt 19,365 0.221 0.070 0.394 0.012 0.291 
fairlv1 19,365 0.100 0.009 0.187 0.000 0.113 
fairlv2 19,365 0.069 0.004 0.153 0.000 0.044 
fairlv3 19,365 0.038 0.000 0.208 0.000 0.004 
dummylv_tt 19,365 0.977 1.000 0.149 1.000 1.000 
dummy_lv1 19,365 0.674 1.000 0.469 0.000 1.000 
dummy_lv2 19,365 0.681 1.000 0.466 0.000 1.000 
dummy_lv3 19,365 0.350 0.000 0.477 0.000 1.000 
frass_lv1 19,365 0.094 0.007 0.182 0.000 0.101 
frlia_lv1 19,365 0.004 0.000 0.029 0.000 0.000 
frass_lv2 19,365 0.051 0.000 0.130 0.000 0.016 
frlia_lv2 19,365 0.017 0.000 0.073 0.000 0.003 
frass_lv3 19,365 0.006 0.000 0.031 0.000 0.000 
frlia_lv3 19,365 0.032 0.000 0.202 0.000 0.000 
big4 19,365 0.741 1.000 0.438 0.000 1.000 
ln_at 19,365 6.332 6.421 2.476 4.809 8.029 
Inv 19,365 0.090 0.043 0.119 0.000 0.139 
Rec 19,365 0.133 0.103 0.131 0.044 0.179 
Cr 19,365 2.993 1.939 3.698 1.206 3.296 
Btm 19,365 0.477 0.444 1.263 0.213 0.764 
Lev 19,365 0.333 0.193 0.750 0.010 0.390 
Empls 19,365 2.146 1.222 2.584 0.464 2.757 
Merger 19,365 0.367 0.000 0.482 0.000 1.000 
ndec_ye 19,365 0.265 0.000 0.442 0.000 1.000 
Roa 19,365 -0.158 0.058 1.258 -0.040 0.117 
Loss 19,365 0.536 1.000 0.499 0.000 1.000 
Mao 19,365 0.271 0.000 0.445 0.000 1.000 
Litig 19,365 0.377 0.000 0.485 0.000 1.000 
Segment 19,365 1.546 1.000 0.960 1.000 2.000 
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Table 7: Fair Value and Audit Fee for Nonfinancial Companies 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
FairValue_tt 0.100***          
  (4.86)          
FairValue-1  0.162*   0.092**      
   (3.59)   (2.15)      
FairValue-2   0.049  0.075      
    (0.97)  (1.48)      
FairValue-3    0.099*** 0.110***      
     (2.78) (3.09)      
Dummy_FV_tt      0.063*     
       (1.74)     
Dummy_FV1       0.055***   0.054*** 
        (3.19)   (3.39) 
Dummy_FV2        0.006  0.029* 
         (0.728)  (1.79) 
Dummy_FV3         0.043*** 0.052*** 
          (2.95) (3.60) 
big4 0.500*** 0.503*** 0.504*** 0.506*** 0.502*** 0.491*** 0.501*** 0.505*** 0.509*** 0.503*** 
  (21.72) (21.8) (21.87) (22.03) (21.71) (20.07) (21.8) (21.95) (22.16) (22.15) 
ln_at 0.436*** 0.433*** 0.432*** 0.434*** 0.436*** 0.434*** 0.431*** 0.432*** 0.431*** 0.426*** 
  (66.85) (67.04) (67.24) (66.67) (66.39) (62.03) (67.04) (65.30) (67.46) (65.50) 
inv 0.075 0.048 0.042 0.038 0.064 0.014 0.043 0.032 0.039 0.041 
  (0.9) (0.57) (0.50) (0.45) (0.76) (0.20) (0.51) (0.38) (0.46) (0.50) 
rec 0.415*** 0.388*** 0.387*** 0.391*** 0.407*** 0.337*** 0.387*** 0.383*** 0.383*** 0.403*** 
  (6.39) (6.00) (5.98) (6.06) (6.26) (4.96) (6.01) (5.94) (5.93) (6.39) 
cr -0.023*** -0.022*** -0.021*** -0.021*** -0.022*** -0.019*** -0.022*** -0.021*** -0.021*** -0.021*** 
  (-11.06) (-10.49) (-10.37) (-10.15) (-10.48) (-7.85) (-10.69) (-10.31) (-10.19) (-10.48) 
btm -0.045*** -0.047*** -0.047*** -0.046*** -0.045*** -0.086*** -0.047*** -0.047*** -0.047*** -0.045*** 
  (-6.87) (-7.10) (-7.10) (-7.03) (-6.92) (-8.91) (-7.16) (-7.14) (-7.10) (-7.16) 
lev -0.052*** -0.038*** -0.039*** -0.045*** -0.046*** -0.067*** -0.036*** -0.038*** -0.039*** -0.037*** 
  (-4.35) (-3.29) (-3.42) (-3.84) (-3.93) (-5.04) (-3.12) (-3.36) (-3.38) (-3.36) 
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Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
empls 0.062*** 0.062*** 0.062*** 0.061*** 0.062*** 0.056*** 0.062*** 0.062*** 0.062*** 0.064*** 
  (11.37) (11.49) (11.47) (11.26) (11.31) (10.08) (11.35) (11.42) (11.50) (11.80) 
fgn 0.016 0.012 0.016 0.015 0.015 -0.023 0.016 0.015 0.012 0.026 
  (0.29) (0.22) (0.28) (0.27) (0.27) (-0.39) (0.28) (0.27) (0.23) (0.46) 
merger 0.113*** 0.112*** 0.111*** 0.110*** 0.113*** 0.099*** 0.111*** 0.110*** 0.108*** 0.112*** 
  (8.11) (8.01) (7.94) (7.90) (8.08) (6.83) (7.99) (7.90) (7.74) (8.14) 
ndec_ye    0.008 0.009 0.010 0.005 0.007 0.008 0.006 
     (0.42) (0.44) (0.47) (0.27) (0.38) (0.40) (0.33) 
roa -0.031*** -0.036*** -0.036*** -0.033*** -0.032*** -0.051*** -0.036*** -0.036*** -0.035*** -0.035*** 
  (-4.62) (-5.29) (-5.33) (-4.90) (-4.78) (-5.18) (-5.31) (-5.34) (-5.20) (-5.22) 
loss 0.182*** 0.180*** 0.180*** 0.182*** 0.181*** 0.192*** 0.183*** 0.181*** 0.179*** 0.183*** 
  (11.28) (11.15) (11.17) (11.28) (11.21) (11.51) (11.31) (11.21) (11.11) (11.49) 
mao 0.094*** 0.097*** 0.096*** 0.092*** 0.094*** 0.073*** 0.097*** 0.095*** 0.091*** 0.094*** 
  (6.53) (6.71) (6.66) (6.39) (6.51) (4.61) (6.76) (6.63) (6.32) (6.58) 
litig 0.025 0.031 0.033 0.035* 0.027 0.033 0.029 0.035* 0.031 0.023 
  (1.19) (1.46) (1.55) (1.67) (1.23) (1.50) (1.36) (1.65) (1.47) (1.06) 
Segment 0.058*** 0.057*** 0.057*** 0.057*** 0.058*** 0.057*** 0.055*** 0.057*** 0.056*** 0.054*** 
  (5.84) (5.82) (5.75) (5.73) (5.83) (5.73) (5.56) (5.73) (5.70) (5.48) 
Intercept 9.953*** 9.988*** 10.010*** 9.986*** 9.951*** 10.232*** 9.974*** 10.003*** 10.000*** 9.948*** 
  (65.02) (65.59) (66.26) (65.84) (65.15) (60.77) (65.68) (66.11) (66.34) (66.37) 
Industry&Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of 
observations 19,365 19,365 19,365 19,365 19,365 19,365 19,365 19,365 19,365 19,365 
Adjusted R2 0.824 0.824 0.824 0.824 0.824 0.821 0.824 0.824 0.824 0.825 
Note: Our audit fee regression model includes fair value measurement variables. The resulting model, including industry and year fixed effects, is specified as: 
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹)𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 =  𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝑉𝑉𝐹𝐹𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽2𝐵𝐵𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵4𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽3𝐹𝐹𝐵𝐵𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽4𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴)𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽5𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽6𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽7𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽8𝐵𝐵𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽9𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 +
𝛽𝛽10𝐹𝐹𝐵𝐵𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 +  𝛽𝛽11𝐵𝐵𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝐵𝐵𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽12𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅_𝑌𝑌𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽13𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽14𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽15𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽16𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽17𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡  
Table 7 (continued) 
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Regression Analysis Results 
Table 7 reports the results of our regression audit fees, specifically Ln(AUDIT FEE) on our Fair 
Value variables along with the control variables. The results show that the total fair value amount 
(FairValue_tt) is positively and significantly (regression coefficient of 0.100 with a t-statistic of 
4.86) associated with audit fees. The results imply that the fair value measurements increase the 
audit efforts and are reflected in a higher audit fee. We also investigate the fair value amounts by 
breaking down total fair value amount (FairValue_tt) into Level 1 (FairValue-1), Level 2 
(FairValue-2), and Level 3 (FairValue-3). In most cases, we find that the estimated regression 
coefficient on the fair value variable is significantly positive. We also test the hypothesis by 
using dichotomized variables (Dummy_FV1, Dummy_FV2, Dummy_FV3). The results are 
consistent with the results based on amounts rather than the dummy variable approach.  
We find that our control variables are generally consistent with prior literature. BIG4, 
Ln(ASSETS), REC, EMPLS, MERGER, LOSS, and SEGMENTS are positively associated with 
audit fees. The variables CR, BTM, and ROA are negatively associated with audit fees. The 
adjusted R2 (0.824) is comparable with prior research (Hribar, Kravet, and Wilson 2014).  
Financial Firm Sample Results 
Table 8 presents the sample selection procedure for our audit fee Model 2, where we extract 
financial data from the Bank Holding Company dataset and audit fee data from Audit Analytics. 
We collect our initial sample of 5,126 firm-year observations from the Bank Holding Company 
for the years 2008 to 2015. We exclude 80 firm-year observations for firms with no information 
in Compustat and 196 firm-year observations for firms with no information from CRSP. Next, 
we require firm year observations to have audit fee data available in Audit Analytics; this 
requirement eliminates 2,170 firm-year observations. Last, we exclude 840 firm-year 
26 
 
observations that lack the necessary data to calculate control variables. Our final sample 
comprises 1,840 firm-year observations for the financial sample. 
 
Table 8: Sample Development for Financial Firms 
  Number of firm years 
Total firm-year observations available in Bank Holding Company,  
2007–2015 5,126 
Less:  
Firms that do not have CIK or GVKEY information from Compustat and 
CRSP -80 
Firms that do not have valid data for the standard deviation of returns from 
CRSP database -196 
Firms that do not have valid and nonzero audit fee disclosure data from 
Audit Analytics -2,170 
Observations with insufficient data to calculate control variables -840 
Final sample 1,840 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 9 reports the descriptive statistics for our sample. We report the mean of our dependent 
variable Ln(AUDITFEE) as 13.04, which is consistent with Ettredge, Xu, and Yi (2014). 
Additionally, the descriptive statistics of the audit fee determinants are consistent with levels 
reported in prior literature (Ettredge, Xu, and Yi 2014; Francis, Reichelt, and Wang 2005). 
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Table 9: Descriptive Statistics for Financial Firms 
Variable N Mean Std Dev Median 25% 75% 
ln_fee 1,840 13.041 1.248 12.797 12.202 13.596 
fva_ta 1,840 0.207 0.147 0.180 0.124 0.254 
fva1_ta 1,840 0.012 0.034 0.000 0.000 0.004 
fva2_ta 1,840 0.188 0.133 0.170 0.110 0.239 
fva3_ta 1,840 0.005 0.012 0.000 0.000 0.003 
logass 1,840 14.992 1.573 14.589 13.896 15.686 
bign 1,840 0.406 0.491 0.000 0.000 1.000 
loss 1,840 0.190 0.392 0.000 0.000 0.000 
stdret 1,840 0.103 0.073 0.080 0.057 0.124 
transacct 1,840 0.673 0.159 0.694 0.573 0.793 
securities 1,840 0.793 0.104 0.808 0.734 0.869 
efficiency 1,840 1.193 0.281 1.155 1.029 1.293 
commloan 1,840 0.165 0.105 0.144 0.090 0.215 
nonperform 1,840 0.029 0.027 0.020 0.011 0.038 
chgoff 1,840 0.468 0.433 0.351 0.157 0.660 
mtgloan 1,840 0.734 0.177 0.779 0.660 0.859 
capratio 1,840 15.197 3.429 14.785 13.235 16.665 
intang 1,840 0.015 0.016 0.009 0.002 0.024 
sensitive 1,840 0.098 0.186 0.100 -0.002 0.208 
savings 1,840 0.055 0.229 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
Multiple Regression Results 
Table 10 reports the results of our regression of the Fair Value measure on audit fees 
(LnAUDITFEE). Model A of table 10 tests whether the coefficient on the proportion of fair value 
amount differs from zero. The results show that the total fair value amount (FairValue_tt) is 
positively and significantly (regression coefficient of 0.580 with a t-statistic of 4.91) associated 
with audit fees for the financial firms. We also investigate the fair value amounts by breaking 
down total fair value amount (FairValue_tt) into level 1 (FairValue-1), level 2 (FairValue-2), 
and level 3 (FairValue-3). In most cases, we find that the fair value amount is significantly 
positive with audit fees.  
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Table 10: Fair Value and Audit Fee for Financial Companies 
Variables 1 2 
FairValue_tt 0.580*** 
 
  (4.91)  
FairValue-1  0.317 
   (0.81) 
FairValue-2  0.490*** 
   (3.69) 
FairValue-3  4.695*** 
   (3.61) 
logass 0.592*** 0.581*** 
  (31.47) (31.38) 
bign 0.399*** 0.403*** 
  (9.66) (9.87) 
loss 0.017 0.015 
  (0.36) (0.33) 
stdret 0.588** 0.521* 
  (2.03) (1.82) 
transacct -0.274* -0.296** 
  (-1.95) (-2.12) 
securities 0.907*** 0.851*** 
  (4.61) (4.33) 
efficiency 0.186*** 0.170*** 
  (3.08) (2.79) 
commloan -0.468** -0.434* 
  (-2.06) (-1.93) 
nonperform 3.309*** 3.370*** 
  (5.27) (5.47) 
chgoff -0.011 -0.007 
  (-0.34) (-0.22) 
mtgloan -0.864*** -0.842*** 
  (-5.33) (-5.12) 
capratio 0.031*** 0.030*** 
  (6.28) (6.2) 
intang 2.173* 2.458** 
  (1.9) (2.16) 
sensitive 0.129 0.135 
  (1.4) (1.5) 
savings 0.046 0.049 
  (0.86) (0.92) 
Intercept 3.275*** 3.500*** 
  (8.86) (9.37) 
Year Dummy Yes Yes 
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Variables 1 2 
    
No. obs. 1840 1840 
    
Adjusted R2 0.9044 0.9056 
Notes: Our audit fee model includes fair value measurement variables. The resulting model, including year fixed 
effects, is specified as: 
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹)𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 =  𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝑉𝑉𝐹𝐹𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽2𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴)𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽3𝐹𝐹𝐵𝐵𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽4𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽5𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡 +
𝛽𝛽6𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽7𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽8𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽9𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽10𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝐸𝐸𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽11𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽12𝐵𝐵𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽13𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽14𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽15𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑉𝑉𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽16𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐵𝐵𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡  
 
The estimated coefficient on the Level 1 fair value variable is .317, but it is statistically 
insignificant. This suggests that there is no statistically significant increase in audit fees 
associated with Level 1 fair values. To the contrary, the estimated coefficient on the Level 2 fair 
value variable is .490, and it is statistically significant at the .001 level. This suggests that audit 
fees are impacted when there are Level 2 fair values. For Level 3 fair values, where reliance on 
observable market values is not available, the estimated coefficient is 4.695 (t-value of 3.61). 
The magnitude of this estimated coefficient is almost 10 times larger than the estimated 
coefficient for Level 2 fair values. This suggests a very substantial increase in the audit fees 
when nonreliance on observable market values is required.  
We find that our control variables are generally consistent with prior literature. BIG4, 
Ln(ASSETS), STDRET, SECURITIES, EFFICIENCY, NONPERFORMANCE, CAPRATIO, and 
INTANG are positively associated with audit fees. The variables TRANSACACC, 
COMMONLOAN, and MTGLOAN are negatively associated with audit fees. The adjusted R2 
(0.904) is comparable with prior research (Ettredge, Xu, and Yi 2014).  
 
Table 10 (continued) 
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Conclusions and Implications  
Our study concludes that the complexity in underlying transactions is reflected in the readability 
level of the associated authoritative guidance. Our further analysis on a specific pronouncement, 
SFAS No. 157, finds that fair value accounting simplifies the readability level of complex 
transactions when the measurement of those transactions can rely on market valuation. We also 
show that auditing of fair values (which are associated with complex transactions) results in 
higher audit fees. In addition, nonreliance on market valuation (i.e., transactions measured at 
Level 3) will greatly exacerbate the audit fee premium. 
 Our inferences may have implications for future standard setting. We suggest that, in 
instances where quoted prices and active markets are readily available, standard-setters could 
simplify the complexity level of the authoritative guidance by relying on market valuation to 
handle complex issues related to definition, timing, and measurement. We agree with Nobes 
(2005) that detailed rules may not necessarily improve the accuracy of financial reporting; 
instead, the reduction of rules could increase clarity.10  
While fair value accounting could simplify the recognition and measurement aspects in 
accounting standards, we recommend this approach with a caveat. Fair value accounting, unlike 
mixed attribute models, lacks the convergence properties (Fellingham et al. 1998). Essentially, 
the convergence properties induce “truth telling.” That is, although reported earnings may not 
agree with cash flows in the short term, the properties would ensure that earnings and cash flows 
should converge in the long term. The convergence properties are useful for disciplining 
                                                 
10 Edward Trott, a member of the FASB from October 1999 to June 2007, argues that the board tends to make 
piecemeal revisions to the standards (Trott 2015). Trott believes that the current standards are already overly 
detailed and that it would require an overhaul to simplify the standards significantly.  
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alternative information sources that are more timely and relevant, as market participants have an 
opportunity to verify the information in the near future. 
In summary, the results of our study do not imply that fair value accounting is always 
better than accounting methods that rely on mixed attribute models. Fair value accounting might 
help to reduce complexity in financial reporting, but this benefit could be outweighed by 
deterioration in other accounting properties.11 We believe that standard-setters should examine 
these trade-offs when promulgating financial reporting standards. 
  
                                                 
11 See Nobes (2005) and Benston, Bromwich, and Wagenhofer (2006) for more discussions about the strengths and 
limitations of fair value accounting. 
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Appendix A: Variable Definitions 
 
Variable  Definition 
Fair Value 
Measure  
FairValue-1 Fair-valued asset and liability amounts using Level 1 inputs scaled by total assets. 
FairValue-2 Fair-valued asset and liability amounts using Level 2 inputs scaled by total assets. 
FairValue-3 Fair-valued asset and liability amounts using Level 3 inputs scaled by total assets. 
Fairvalue_tt Aggregated value of fair-valued asset and liability amounts using Level 1, 2, 3. 
Dummy_FV_tt An indicator variable that equals 1 if Level 1, Level 2, or Level 3 has value, and 0 otherwise. 
Dummy_FV1 An indicator variable that equals 1 if Level 1 has value, and 0 otherwise. 
Dummy_FV2 An indicator variable that equals 1 if Level 2 has value, and 0 otherwise. 
Dummy_FV3 An indicator variable that equals 1 if Level 3 has value, and 0 otherwise. 
Audit Fee 
Measure  
Ln(AUDIT FEE) Natural log of audit fee (AUDIT_FEE). Source: Audit Analytics 
Audit Fee Determinants 
BIG4 
Indicator variable equal to 1 when the client’s auditor is a member of the Big 
5 (or Big 4 after the exit of Arthur Andersen) (AUDITOR_FKEY<6) and zero 
otherwise. Source: Audit Analytics 
Ln(ASSETS) Natural logarithm of total assets (AT) at fiscal year-end. Source: Compustat 
FGN Indicator variable that equals 1 if the client is involved in Foreign Exchange Income (FCA), and 0 otherwise. Source: Compustat 
INV Inventory (INVT) scaled by lagged total assets (AT). Source: Compustat 
REC Receivables (RECT) scaled by lagged total assets (AT). Source: Compustat 
CR Current ratio calculated as current assets (ACT) divided by current liabilities (LCT). Source: Compustat 
BTM 
Market-to-book ratio at the beginning of the year measured as book value of 
equity (CEQ) divided by market value of equity (PRCC_F*CSHO). Source: 
Compustat 
LEV Sum of short-term debt (DLC) and long-term debt (DLTT) scaled by lagged total assets (AT). Source: Compustat 
EMPLS Square root of the number of employees (EMP) (measured in thousands) disclosed in Form 10-K filings. Source: Compustat 
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MERGER Indicator variable that equals 1 if the client is involved in mergers or acquisitions (AQC), and 0 otherwise. Source: Compustat 
NDEC_YE Indicator variable equal to 1 if the fiscal year-end (FYR) does not  end in December and 0 otherwise. Source: Compustat 
ROA Operating income after depreciation (OIADP) scaled by lagged total assets (AT). Source: Compustat 
LOSS 
Indicator variable equal to 1 if income before extraordinary items and 
discontinued operations (IB) is negative in the current or two previous years 
and 0 otherwise. Source: Compustat 
MAO 
Indicator variable equal to 1 if the client receives a modified audit opinion 
(AUOP) and 0 otherwise, where a modified opinion is defined as anything 
other than a standard unqualified audit opinion coded as one by Compustat. 
Source: Compustat 
LITRISK 
Indicator variable equal to 1 for high litigation risk industries (SIC 2833–2836; 
3570–3577; 7370–7374; 3600–3674; 5200–5961; 8731–8734) and 0 
otherwise, as defined in Francis, Philbrick, and Schipper (1994). Source: 
Compustat 
SEGMENTS Number of business segments. Source: Compustat 
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Appendix B: Variable Definitions 
Variable  Definition 
Fair Value Measure 
FairValue-1 Fair-valued asset and liability amounts using Level 1 inputs scaled by total assets. 
FairValue-2 Fair-valued asset and liability amounts using Level 2 inputs scaled by total assets. 
FairValue-3 Fair-valued asset and liability amounts using Level 3 inputs scaled by total assets. 
Fairvalue_tt Aggregated value of fair-valued asset and liability amounts using Level 1, 2, and 3 inputs. 
Audit Fee Measure 
Ln(AUDIT FEE) Natural log of audit fee (AUDIT_FEE). Source: Audit Analytics 
Audit Fee Determinants 
BIG4 
Indicator variable equal to 1 when the client’s auditor is a member of the Big 
5 (or Big 4 after the exit of Arthur Andersen) (AUDITOR_FKEY<6) and 0 
otherwise. Source: Audit Analytics 
Ln(ASSETS) Natural logarithm of total assets (AT) at the fiscal year end. Source: Bank Holding  
LOSS 
Indicator variable equal to 1 if income before extraordinary items and 
discontinued operations (IB) is negative in the current or two previous years 
and 0 otherwise. Source: Bank Holding  
STDRET Standard deviation of 12-month returns ending upon the fiscal year end and measuring the operating risk of the firm. Source: CSRP 
TRANSACC Total transaction accounts deflated by total deposits. Source: Bank Holding 
SECURITIES One less total securities deflated by total assets. Source: Bank Holding 
EFFICIENCY Total operating expenses deflated by total revenue. Source: Bank Holding 
COMMLOAN The sum of commercial and agricultural loans deflated by gross loans. Source: Bank Holding 
NONPERFORM Nonperforming loans divided by gross loans. Source: Bank Holding 
CHGOFF Net charge-offs deflated by loan loss reserve. Source: Bank Holding 
MTGLOAN Total domestic real estate and home equity loans divided by gross loans. Source: Bank Holding 
CAPRATIO Total risk-adjusted capital ratio. Source: Bank Holding 
INTANG Intangible assets divided by total assets. Source: Bank Holding 
SENSITIVE The ratio of rate-sensitive assets minus rate-sensitive liabilities to total assets. Source: Bank Holding 
SAVINGS Coded as 1 if the company is a savings institution (SIC codes 6035 and 6036), 0 otherwise. Source: Bank Holding 
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